

# **Optimal rental market regulation**

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### Housing and macroeconomic imbalances: some lessons learned

- □ The link housing markets ↔ credit ↔ construction ↔ current account and competitiveness
- ❑ Housing market corrections have adverse impacts:
  - Consumption and investment
  - Banking sector fragilities and restricted credit to the economy at large
  - Both economic and social distress

#### Homeownership and occurrence of crises

- Countries' starting points differ historical "legacies"
- Not high levels, but strong increases in homeownership tended to be associated with imbalances



# Housing market demand and supply incentives





# The value of rental markets

#### Key role in a healthy housing market "mix"

- As a housing option for credit-constrained households
- Relevant in specific phases of a person's life-cycle
- Labour mobility (within and between countries)

#### □ Importance for the overall housing market

- Rental affects incentives for housing supply (new and renovated)
- Stabilisation effect on house prices (arbitrage between markets?)

# Rental market regulation as part of an integrated housing market strategy



## Why we need rental market regulation

- Protect the tenant and the landlord where they are vulnerable
  - Landlord: mitigate asymmetric information, guarantee property rights
  - Tenant: need of predictability, reflect search&moving costs, social aspects

#### Need to align incentives for both parties to ensure that the market functions well

- Ensure a return on investment for the owner
- Provide a genuine long-term solution for housing needs for the tenant



### Main aspects of rental regulation

- Following previous OECD work 7 aspects in rental regulation were collected and analysed:
  - 1. Rental level control
  - 2. Rental increases control
  - 3. Deposit requirements
  - 4. Justified reasons for tenant eviction
  - 5. Eviction notification requirements
  - 6. Duration of contracts
  - 7. Procedural formalism





# **Extracting and identifying main dimensions**

 Data analysis reveals three main components: rent control, tenantlandlord relationship, and court efficiency.





## **Composite indicators of rental market frictions**

• Indicators measure the degree by which countries create frictions through rent controls or through restrictions of the tenant-landlord relationship.



**Rent control friction indicator** 

#### Tenant-landlord relationship friction indicator





# **Effect on house price volatility**

- The two indicators of frictions were used in a model of house prices on a panel of 15 EU countries (Cuerpo et al., 2014).
- Main finding:
  - ✓ Rent controls **amplify housing market volatility**: higher house price response to shocks to fundamentals (e.g. income, interest rates).
    - Possible transmission channels: low availability of rental dwellings, less responsive housing supply etc.
  - ✓ The regulations of tenant-landlord relationships have less direct influence on house price developments.
    - > Balanced regulation can be used to ensure that a private market develops.



#### **Effect on house price volatility**

#### Response of real house prices to shocks under different rent control regimes (minimum, average, and maximum rent control in the sample)





#### **Rental market reform in Spain, 2013**

- Liberalized rent-setting of new leases
- Minimum contract duration reduced to 3 years
- Termination by tenant anytime (notice and possible penalty), by landlord for personal use or if change of owner





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#### Spain before and after reform, TL



#### **Other recent rental market reforms**

#### **Some countries aimed at higher flexibility...**

- Portugal: phasing out a long-standing rent control system
- The Netherlands: better linking rent changes to income (social rental) to encourage tenure mobility, refocus housing associations on social housing

#### □ ...while others went for rent-control measures

- France and Germany recently introduced rent-control mechanisms in cities with tight housing markets
- Relative rent controls ("benchmark" rent levels), rather than absolute ones



# **Conclusion and policy recommendations**

- Some ideas for an optimal rental market regulation:
  - Strict rent controls can hinder the functioning of the housing market (we can fix prices or quantities, but not both).
    - > Potential adverse effects on housing supply.
    - > More targeted policies seem preferable to pursue social objectives.
  - ✓ Qualitative contract regulation does not have an obvious negative impact on housing markets:
    - Balance between (i) security and predictability for tenants, and (ii) ensuring property rights for landlords.
    - > Some asymmetry is needed (tenant: right to stay but flexibility to leave)
  - ✓ Efficient contract enforcement as a necessary condition for rental markets.<sub>13</sub>



# Thank you!

