

# Never for Ever

*Is the world really getting more complex,  
unpredictable and volatile?*

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
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# *Is the world really getting more complex, unpredictable and volatile?*

- Is there any empirical evidence for an accelerated change in the world?
- Is there really greater change today than in the past?
  - we will look at population growth, wars & technology
  - within a historical context
- In what sense is the world complex and unpredictable?
- Is it becoming more complex?
  - from a complexity theory perspective

# World Population: 1950-2050




Source: U.S. Census Bureau, International Data Base, June 2011 Update.

# *The end of world population growth*

*W. Lutz, W. Sanderson & S. Scherbov\**

- **Population growth is likely to come to an end in the foreseeable future**
- Improving on earlier methods of probabilistic forecasting, the authors show that there is:
  - **85%** chance that the world's population will stop growing before the end of the century
  - **60%** probability that the world's population will not exceed 10 billion people before 2100
  - **15%** probability that the world's population at the end of the century will be lower than it is today
  - For different regions, the date and size of the peak population will vary considerably

\*Lutz, W, Sanderson, WC and S Scherbov, 'The end of world population growth,' *Nature*, vol. 412, no. 6846 (2 August 2001), 543-545



## *Forecasted distributions of world population sizes*

Distribution of simulated world population sizes over time. The median value of the projections reaches **a peak around 2070 at 9.0 billion people and then slowly decreases**

In 2100, the **median** value of the projections is 8.4 billion people

The **medium** scenario of the most recent United Nations long-range projection is almost identical to the median until the middle of the century, but is higher thereafter owing to the United Nations assumption of universal replacement-level fertility, that is two surviving children per woman.

Lutz, Sanderson and Scherbov, 'The end of world population growth', *Nature*

# Trends in Great Power War




Figure 1: Frequency of Great Power War, 25-Year Intervals

TABLE 3  
Average Frequency of Great Power War per Decade  
for Each Century


Century	Average Frequency per Decade
16th	2.6
17th	1.7
18th	1.0
19th	.50
20th	.66

Source: Levy, Jack S. 'Historical Trends in Great Power War, 1495-1975,' *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 26, No. 2 (June 1982), 278-300.

# *Wars are becoming less frequent*

*KS Gleditch & S Pickering\**

- There is no reason to suspect that states no longer have contentious issues
- Indeed they have increased with greater interaction and globalisation
- However, **development, democratisation and capitalism may have made it easier for states to reach agreement and avoid escalation to war and more costly to fail to reach agreement**
- Trend towards a decline in war is also facilitated by global macro-trends such as increases in education and urbanisation
- As they foster attitudes that make people less likely to glorify violence and more likely to seek rational compromise
- \*Economic History Review, 67, 1 (2014), pp 214-230





# *Industrial Revolution: 1760-1840*

- This transition included:
  - going from hand production methods to machines,
  - new chemical manufacturing and iron production processes,
  - improved efficiency of water power
  - the increasing use of steam power
  - the development of machine tools
  - the change from wood and other bio-fuels to coal
- Started in Great Britain and spread to Western Europe and the United States within a few decades
- Economic historians agree that the *onset of the Industrial Revolution is the most important event in the history of humanity since the domestication of animals, plants and fire.*

# *Important technological developments*

- Industrial Revolution is closely linked to a small number of innovations, beginning in the second half of the 18th century

By the 1830s the following gains had been made in important technologies:

- **Textiles** – Mechanised cotton spinning powered by steam or water increased the **output of a worker by a factor of about 1000**
- **Steam power** – The efficiency of steam engines increased so that they used between **one-fifth and one-tenth as much fuel**
- **Iron making** – The substitution of coke for charcoal greatly lowered the fuel cost for pig iron and wrought iron production
  - Using coke also allowed larger blast furnaces, resulting in **economies of scale**

# *Is Technological Development Accelerating?*

- Consider the technological development between 1825 - 1960
  - railways
  - electric light and telephones,
  - cars and airplanes,
  - the atomic bomb and nuclear power,
  - vacuum electronics, semiconductor electronics, the computer
  - plastics,
  - most vaccines and antibiotics
  - manned space flight
- In 1903 the Wright Brothers achieved man's first flight
  - less than 60 years later, Yuri Gagarin was in space
- Child mortality was drastically cut, up to 80% during that period
- **In human terms these achievements, in such a short space of time, are vast**

# *Is Technological Development Accelerating?*

- The kind of innovation that has profound social impact
- What major innovations have taken place in the past half century apart from the internet, increase in computing power & information processing?
  - incremental change – the *'next adjacent'*
- *"The pace of change has actually, generation by generation, been slowing down..." - Paul Krugman (Nobel Economics Laureate), speaking at Worldcon, 2009*

## Summary

- Is there any empirical evidence for an accelerated change in the world?
- Is there really greater change today than in the past?
  - we looked at population growth, wars & technology
  - within a historical context
- *Evidence is that there is **no** accelerated change*
- So why do we *feel* that the world is getting more complex, unpredictable and volatile?
- To answer that question we need to understand what 'complexity' means based on *complexity science*

# *In what sense is the world complex?*

- Distinction between complicated and complex
- Non-linear and unpredictable
- + complex systems exhibit the following characteristics:
  - Emergence
  - Self-organisation
  - Exploration of the space of possibilities
  - Co-evolution
  - Creation of new order

# Conclusions

- If we understand our societies, institutions and the world as a whole, as complex systems
- We cannot possibly be surprised that the world is unpredictable and volatile!
  
- Is the world becoming **more** complex?
- I doubt it
  
- We may *feel* that the world is getting more complex, unpredictable and volatile
- But we need to distinguish between objective reality based on complexity science and our subjective perceptions

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*Thank you ...*

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[www.lse.ac.uk/complexity](http://www.lse.ac.uk/complexity)